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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
W. B. RUSSELL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corpor-
ation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7647 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PRELIMINARY STAT'EMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
The italics are ours. 
In making up the record on appeal the Clerk of the 
District Court used a stamp on the judgment roll numbering 
the pages from 1 to 73, inclusive, but did not number the 
reporter's transcript of the proceedings had at the trial 
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and the transcript bears the reporter's numbers, pages 1 
to 54, inclusive. We will therefore refer to the reporter's 
transcript of the proceedings. had at the trial as (Tr. -) 
and other portions of the record as ( R. -) . 
This case was tried before the Hon. Charles G. Cowley, 
Judge of the District Court of Weber County, sitting with-
out a jury, and resulted in a money judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $18,-
892.76, together with costs of suit. 
The pleadings in this~ case appear voluminous owing to 
the fact that a number of appearances were made before the 
court prior to trial, which involved hearings on demurrers, 
various motions, applications for amendment, etc. by both 
plaintiff and defendant. The issues, however, at the time 
of the trial were quite simple and in order to be of as much 
assistance to the court as. possible we will endeavor to keep 
this statement of facts confined to those matters relating to 
the issues litigated by the parties at the trial and which 
are pertinent to this appeal. The plaintiff presented the 
entire facts of his. case to the court in a few minutes, owing 
largely to stipulations entered into and admissions made 
by the defendant. Plaintiff did not testify and he called no 
witnesses. Therefore, in the first place, we think we should 
set forth those facts which were either admitted in the 
pleadings or stipulated to by the parties at the trial. 
The corporate existence of the defendant was admitted 
and it was admitted that the plaintiff on August 3, 1945 
was, and had since August 18, 1941, been employed by the 
defendant as. a switchman at its terminal yards at Ogden, 
Utah; that there had been in existence since October 1, 1942, 
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and during all the time of plaintiff's employment, a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the defendant carrier 
and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen covering wages, 
working conditions, procedure for discipline, and all such 
other details usually covered in agreements of this type. 
The agreement covered all "yardmen" employed by the 
defendant within the limits of the yards at Ogden, and the 
defendant admitted and now admits that whatever the 
duties of employes were, who were classified as yardmen 
working within the Ogden Yard, they were entitled to all 
the benefits of this contract (Plaintiff's Ex. "E"), whether 
they belonged to the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 
The Switchmen's Union of North America, some other 
union, or were members of no union at all. It was undis-
puted that the plaintiff was a member of the Switchman's 
Union of North America, performed all of his duties within 
the limits of the Ogden Yard, was classified as a yardman 
within the contemplation of the agreement referred to, en-
titled to the benefits thereof, and subject to its, burdens .. 
On August 3, 1945, pursuant to notice, the plaintiff ap-
peared, with the Local Chairman of the Switchmen's Union 
of North America as his representative, before the Assistant 
Superintendent of the defendant company to answer a 
charge of violating the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement governing his employment; specifically, for 
having been absent from duty for a period in excess of ten 
days without having secured and filled out "Form 153" as 
provided for in Article XIII, Section 55 (b) , of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit "E"). The 
testimony was stenographically reported (Plaintiff's Ex. 
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"A") , and as the examiner found that the plaintiff was 
guilty of the charge, the plaintiff was dismissed from the 
service of the defendant company on August 4, 1945. No 
issue was made and no evidence was offered at the trial 
by the plaintiff in support of any claim that the defendant 
company had failed to follow the agreement in giving the 
plaintiff proper notice of the time and place of hearing, 
opportunity to prepare any defense he cared to, or that he 
was denied the right to a representative of his own choos· 
ing, or full opportunity to be heard in person or to 
have witnes'Ses to testify in his behalf, or to present 
any other evidence he desired. The only claim plaintiff made 
at the trial in support of his alleged right to recover was 
that he was not given a "fair and impartial hearing" and 
was dismissed without "just cause," and that the defend· 
ant therefore was guilty of a breach of the collective barg-
aining agreement in dismissing him from service. 
The plaintiff in his complaint demanded that the 
court award him damages for "all time lost," asking pay 
for every single day, that is, 365 days a year, from the date 
of plaintiff's discharge August 4, 1945, to the date of trial 
September 7, 1950 (Complaint R. 4; Amendment to Com-
plaint R. 43) . He also asked the court to order the defend-
ant to reinstate him in his former employment without any 
impairment of his seniority rights. The trial court, it ap-
pears, decided the case entirely . upon the written transcript 
of the hearing before the defe·ndant's Assistant Superin-
tendent, and. on that alone, and entered judgment for the 
full amount prayed for, $18,892.76, but did not direct the 
defendant to reinstate plaintiff in his employment. 
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The defendant in its answer (R. 5) and in its amend-
ment to its answer (R. 14), denied that it had dismissed 
the plaintiff without sufficient cause and justification and 
denied the charge that the plaintiff's conduct failed to 
show a violation of the collective bargaining agreement 
under which he \Vas employed and alleged affirmatively 
that the conduct of the plaintiff was in violation of said 
agreement and that the dismissal was justified. The court 
admitted the transcript of the investigation, considered it 
as substantive evidence and conclusive, although the wit-
nesses are not sworn at such investigations, and refused to· 
hear any evidence offered by defendant to show it was 
justified in dismissing the plaintiff. 
The defendant also denied that the plaintiff had been 
damaged in any sum by reason of the matters charged in 
the complaint and in addition thereto set forth the following 
affirmative matters : 
FIRST: That any damages plaintiff might have 
suffered could have been mitigated by the plaintiff 
and averted or avoided, in whole or in part, by 
plaintiff securing remunerative employment after 
his dismissal, other than employment by the de-
fendant (R. 6). 
SECOND: That the plaintiff was not entitled 
to reinstatement or to recover damages for the rea-
son that he had not, following his dismissal, complied 
with ArticlE VIII, Rule 38, of the agreement cover-
ing the procedure upon application for reinstate-
ment (the detail of which will be covered herein-
after), and that the defendant was powerless to re-
instate the plaintiff at any time after his dismissal 
without violating the agreement as to· all of its other 
employes ( R. 14) . 
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THIRD: That the plaintiff failed to object to 
his dismissal until the 14th day of January, 1946, 
and that therefore, in any event, he would not be 
entitled to recover any lost time or damages between 
the date of his dismissal and the 24th day of Janu-
ary, 1946, account Article VIII, Rule 38, of the 
agreement providing that objection to dismissal 
must be filed "not later than thirty days from the 
date of dismissal ; otherwise, pay for lost time will 
commence ten days after date of letter of objection." 
(R. 15, and the agreement, Plaintiff's Ex. "A".) 
(The court respected this. provision of the contract 
and did not give plaintiff "lost time" for this period, 
so it is not discussed hereafter.) 
FOURTH: The defendant pleaded that the plain-
tiff had, through a representative of the Switch-
men's Union of North America, whom he had ap-
pointed as his representative to handle his grievance 
with the defendant, confessed that his testimony 
given at the hearing was false, advised the defend-
ant that his claim was withdrawn and advis1ed the de-
fendant that it might consider the case "closed," and 
that the defendant company ever since receiving 
such advice on May 14, 1946 had treated the matter 
as closed and terminated and that by reason thereof 
plaintiff had no rights under said agreement, or 
otherwise, which he could assert against the defend-
ant company for back wages or reinstatement, and 
if any su·ch right ever d1id exist plaintiff was 
estopped to assert the same (R. 15, 16). 
The plaintiff's. case having been presented to the court 
almost entirely on defendant's admissions in the pleadings 
and stipulations entered into at the trial, we do not antici-
pate that counsel for the plaintiff can take any serious ex-
ception to our statement thus far. 
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In connection with the first affirmative defense the 
undisputed evidence was that the plaintiff earned between 
the date of his dismissal and the date of trial in outside 
employment the sum of $7,774.39. The trial court refused 
to take this into consideration in mitigation of damages. 
''rith respect to the second affirmative defense, Article 
VIII, Rule 38, of the agreement under which plaintiff was 
employed (Plaintiff's Ex. "E") provides in part as follows: 
"In case dismissal is found to be unjust, yard-
men shall be reinstated and paid for all time lost, 
provided, objection has been filed with the Super-
intendent in writing not later than thirty days from 
date of dismissal, otherwise, pay for time lost will 
commence ten days after date of letter of objection. 
"Reinstatement will not be permitted after the 
expiration of six months from date of dismissal, un-
less agreeable to the management and the general 
committee, except that a case pending with either the 
BRT or ORC at the expiration of the six-month 
period will not be prejudiced. Where the yardman 
involved has been out of service six months or less 
it will not be obligatory to consult the committees 
representing these classes of employes in consider-
ing the case for reinstatement." 
The plaintiff did nothing about seeking reconsideration 
or reinstatement until the lapse of nearly five and a half 
months, at which time, that is, January 14, 1946, J. B. 
Hudgens, Local Chairman of the Switchmen's Union of 
North America, wrote to Mr. R. E. Edens, defendant's 
Superintendent at Ogden, asking him to reconsider the de-
cision and reinstate Mr. Russell in his employment (Plain-
tiff's Ex. "B"). On January 22, 1946, Mr. R. E. Edens, 
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the Superintendent, advised Mr. Hudgens that this applica-
tion for reinstatement of Russell was denied. The Switch-
men's Union of North America was authorized in writing 
by Mr. W. B. Russell to represent him and attached to Mr. 
Hudgen's letter to Mr. Edens is such written authorization, 
which at the trial was. not disputed (Tr. 4). At the expira-
tion of the six-month period following dismissal there was 
nothing pending with either the BRT· or ORC and the de-
fendant in connection with this case. 
Mr. H. C. Beckett, who was and for 15 years had been, 
the Local Chairman of the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men in the Ogden Yards, testified that the BRT was the 
sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the yardmen in the 
Ogden Yards (Tr. 44, 45); that Mr. Russell, in person or 
by or through anyone else, never at any time requested or 
solicited the BRT in the Ogden Yards to petition for his 
reinstatement. Mr. Edens testified that he never at any 
time following the dismissal received an application or peti-
tion from either the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen or 
the Order of Railroad Conductors during the six-month 
period or thereafter for reinstatement or reconsideration 
of the plaintiff's dismissal (Tr. 41, 42). 
We then sought to prove that the Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen had never been, at any time, agreeable to 
the reinstatement of Mr. Russell, and although Mr. Beckett 
so testified, his answers were stricken (Tr. 46). As there 
was not pending from the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men or the ORC (Mr. Edens' testimony Tr. 41, 42), or 
from anyone else an application for reinstatement at the 
expiration of the six .. month period following dismissal, it 
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was necessary to show that it was not agreeable to the 
"General Committee" of the BofRT to reinstate the plain-
tiff. Two things were necessary to support this affirma-
tive defense, first, that at the expiration of the six-month 
period following dismissal there was no application for re-
instatement of the plaintiff pending with the management 
from either the BofRT or the ORC; and second, to show 
that the General Committee was never agreeable at any 
time after the six-month period had expired to the plain-
tiff's reinstatement. The court permitted us to prove 
through Mr. Edens' testimony referred to above and ap-
pearing at Tr. 41, 42, that at no time did the Brotherhood 
of Railroad Trainmen or the ORC have pending with the 
management an application for reinstatement of the plain-
tiff, but refused to permit us to prove that the "General 
Committee" was unwilling to consent to the plaintiff's re-
instatement after the six-month period from date of dis-
missal had expired. We were prepared to show that the 
"General Committee" as used in the agreement meant the 
General Committee of the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men, and that the ORC was not involved or required to give 
its consent after the expiration of six months to reinstate-
ment, but in view of the fact that the· .testimony of Mr. 
Beckett, the Local Chairman of the BofRT, that the BofRT 
was not agreeable to the reinstatement (Tr. 46) was 
promptly stricken, we think we were justified in not offend-
ing against the court's ruling by pursuing the matter fur-
ther. With no application for reinstatement pending from 
either the BofRT or ORC, and the BofRT being unwilling 
to consent to reinstatement after the six-month period, the 
defendant, had it so desired, could not have reinstated the 
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plaintiff without breaching the agreement with every em-
ploye in the Ogden Yard who would be set down one place 
on the seniority roster because of plaintiff's reinstatement. 
We apologize for interjecting in this "statement of facts" 
the foregoing explanatory matter, but it seemed necessary 
in order to establish the significance of this affirmative 
defense. 
With respect to the third affirmative defense, the 
court respected the contract and did not allow "lost time" 
as damages between the date of dismissal and ten days after 
receipt of plaintiff's application for reinstatement. 
With respect to the fourth affirmative defense, the 
defendant introduced a letter from Mr. C. E. McDaniels, 
Acting Vice President of the Switchmen's Union of North 
America, dated F·ebruary 15, 1946, addres~sed to Mr. F. C. 
Paulsen, Vice President of the defendant company (Plain-
tiff's Ex. "D"), to which was attached the written authori-
zation of the plaintiff authorizing the Switchmen's Union 
of North Ame-rica to represent him, and in which recon-
sideration and reinstatement was requested by the plain-
tiff. 
Defendant also introduced a letter written by Mr. Mc-
Daniels May 14, 1946 to Mr. F. C. Paulsen (Defendant's 
Ex. "3"), in which he refers to an agreement reached be-
tween himself and Mr. Paulsen wherein he undertook to 
investigate "undesirable procedure on the part of Mr. 
Russell resulting in false testimony evidenced during formal 
investigation of August 3, 1945." He then states. in the 
last paragraph of his letter that their investigation of the 
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alleged false testimony of Mr. Russell has been completed 
and that, and we quote, "we are withdrawing the grievance 
and the case h~ closed." 
Mr. R. E. Edens, Superintendent of the defendant com-
pany, was sworn and testified that Mr. McDaniels' last 
letter (defendant's Ex. "3") was given to him by Mr. 
Paulsen, to whom it was addressed, and that ever since said 
date the defendant company had considered· the matter 
a closed issue (Tr. 42, 43) . 
The original fully executed contract between the de-
fendant and BofRT was introduced in evidence and it was 
stipulated that plaintiff's Exhibit "E", a true copy, might 
be substituted therefor (Tr. 44). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AT THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION AS SUB-
STANTIVE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS 
THEREIN STATED. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN REFUSING T·O GRANT THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT 
OF NONSUIT. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING 
THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT HAD 
BREACHED THE COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING AGREEMENT SOLELY· UPON THE 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE UNSWORN TESTI-
MONY GIVEN AT THE. OFFICIAL INVESTI-
GATION; IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVI-
DENCE PROFFERED BY THE DEFENDANT 
TO SHOW JUSTIFICATION FOR .PLAINTIFF'S 
DISMISSAL; AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT PLAIN-
TIFF'S T·ESTIMONY CONTAINED IN SAID 
TRANS·CRIPT WAS FALSE. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN ASSESSING AND FIXING 
·DAMAGES: 
(a) IN REFUSING TO ALLOW AS MITIGA-
TION OF DAMAGES THE AMOUNT OF 
MONEY EARNED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN 
OTHER EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN THE 
DATE OF HIS DISMISSAL BY THE DEFEND-
ANT AND THE DATE OF TRIAL; 
(bY IN HOLDING THAT THE MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CON-
TRACT WAS THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF 
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WOULD HAVE EARNED HAD HE WORKED 
EACH AND EVERY DAY AT HIS FORMER 
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT 
BETWEEN THE RECEIPT BY DEFEND-
ANT OF HIS APPLICATION F"OR REIN-
STATEMENT AND THE DAY OF TRIAL, 
SEPTEMBER 7, 1950, A PERIOD IN EXCESS 
OF FIVE YEARS; 
(c) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT' THE DEFEN-
DANT TO PROV·E THAT T'HE PLAINTIFF 
DURING HIS EMPLOYMENT B·Y THE DE-
FENDANT WORKED ONLY A PO·RTION OF 
THE TIME ALTHOUGH STE'ADY EMPLOY-
MENT WAS AVAILABLE TO HIM. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE 
THAT IT WAS POWERLESS TO REINSTAT·E 
THE PLAINTIFF IN HIS EMPLOYMENT 
AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF SIX MONTHS 
FROM THE DATE OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT 
THE CONSENT OF THE BROTHER.HOO·D OF 
RAILROAD TRAINMEN, AND IN EXCLUDING 
DEFENDANT'S PROFFER OF EVIDENCE TO 
SHOW THAT THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAIL-
ROAD TRAINMEN WAS NEVER AT ANY 
TIME WILLING TO CONSENT TO PLAIN-
TIFF'S REINSTATEMENT BY THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
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POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS WITHOUT ANY 
RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR 
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CO~ 
TRACT, OR IF SUCH RIGHT AT ANY TIME 
DID EXIST, IN FAILING T·O FIND THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS FORECLOSED AND ESTOP-
PED FROM ASSERTING THE SAME. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY COMPE-
TENT EVIDENCE IN THE CASE, AND IN 
ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT UPON SUCH 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AT T·HE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION AS SUB-
STANTIVE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS 
THEREIN STATED. 
We think it might be helpful if at the very outset we 
set forth just what the nature of this proceeding was in 
the court below. 
This case is a common-law action for breach of con-
tract and nothing else. The trial court had the right to 
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determine whether or not the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the carrier and its employe, the plaintiff, 
had been breached and to apply ordinary common-law prin-
ciples of the law of damages in assessing damages, if it 
- found that the defendant carrier had breached the contract. 
That \Vas the full extent of the trial court's power to act in 
r-
t a proceeding of this kind, and it was wholly without juris-
:. diction to decide anything else. Slocum v. Delaware, Lackar 
wana & Western Railroad,~9 U. S. 239, 94 L. Ed. 534, 70 
S. Ct. 577, decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States April 10, 1950. Order of Railway Conductors v. 
Southern Ra.iltvay Company, 339 U. S. 255, 94 L. Ed. 542, 
70 S. Ct. 585, also decided by the Supreme Court of the 
United States April 10, 1950. Order of Ra~lway Conductors 
v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, 90 L. Ed. 318, 66 S. Ct. 322. 
We think it is generally conceded that following the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Moore v. 
Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, 85 L. Ed. 1089, 61 
S. Ct. 754, the bar, and bench both state and federal, con-
sidered that an employe of a carrier had an election to pur-
sue his remedy for an alleged breach of a railway collective 
bargaining agreement either before the administrative 
body set up by the Railway Labor Act, that is, the National 
Railroad Adjustment Board, or to take his grievance into 
the courts, either state or federal. Whether such generally 
held opinion was justified or not is really immaterial to 
this discussion because the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the Slocum case, supra, definitely held that the 
jurisdiction of the Railroad Adjustment Board to adjust 
grievances and disputes of all kinds arising out of collec-
tive bargaining agreements in the railroad industry, is 
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exclusive; that no court, either state or federal, has. a right 
to usurp the exclusive powers of the Railroad Adjustment 
Board, the congressionally designated agency, to determine 
any question involving the interpretation of such agree-
ments. The case holds that no court, state or federal, has 
the power to order reinstatement by a carrier of any em-
ploye. The decision does, however, countenance maintain-
ing in a court a suit by an employe for damages for breach 
of a collective bargaining agreement. This decision in-
stantly drew the attention of the entire railroad industry 
and has become a landmark. 
Mr. Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of the 
court, stated as follows: 
"Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act confers 
jurisdiction on the National Railway Adjustment 
Board to hold hearings, make findings, and enter 
awards in all disputes between carriers and their 
employees 'growing out of grievances or out of the 
interpretation or application of agreements concern-
ing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions 
* * * .' The question presented is whether state 
courts have power to adjudicate disputes involving 
such interpretations when the Adjustment Board 
has not acted." 
T'he defendant railroad in the Slocum case had separate 
collective bargaining agreements with the Orde·r of Railroad 
Telegraphers and the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks. Each 
organization claimed that its membe·rs were entitled to cer-
. tain jobs. The railroad agreed with the Clerks Union. The 
telegraphers protested and, it appears, pursued their claims 
as required under the Railway Labor Act in such respects 
as was necessary and preliminary to invoking the j urisdic-
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tion of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The rail-
road brought a suit for declaratory judgment in the New 
York State court, praying for an interpretation of both 
agreements and for a declaration that the clerks' agreement 
covered the jobs in controversy and naming both unions 
as defendants. The telegraphers moved to dismiss on the 
grounds that the Railway Labor Act left the state court 
without jurisdiction to interpret the contracts and adjudicate 
the dispute. The motion was denied and the judgment deny-
ing the motion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of 
New York. As Mr. Justice Black stated in his opinion, 
"The majority (of the New York Court of Ap-
peals) thought that our opinion in Moore v. Illinois 
Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, left state courts free 
to adjudicate disputes arising out of a carrier-union 
collective bargaining agreement without obtaining 
the Board's interpretation of that agreement." 
As we stated above, the New York Court of Appeals 
was following the opinion generally held by the legal pro-
fession that the parties to collective bargaining agreements 
in the railroad industry had a right to elect whether they 
would present disputes under such agreements to the Rail-
road Adjustment Board or to the courts. While the facts 
in the Slocum case, supra, are at variance with the case now 
before this court, the principle which was therein adaudi-
cated is clearly applicable. The opinion is short and we 
quote therefrom such important portions as appear pertin-
ent. Mr. Justice Black: 
"In this case the dispute concerned interpre-
tation of an existing bargaining agreement. Its 
settlement would have prospective as well as retro-
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spective importance to both the railroad and its em-
ployees, since the interpretation accepted would gov-
ern future relations of those parties. * * * 
"The Act (Railway Labor Act) represents a 
considered effort on the part of Congress to pro-
vide effective and desirable administrative remedies 
for adjustment of railroad-employee disputes grow-
ing out of the interpretation of existing agreements. 
The Adjustment Board is well equipped to exercise 
its congressionally imposed functions. Its members 
understand railroad problems and speak the railroad 
jargon. Long and varied experiences have added to 
the Board's initial qualifications. Precedents estab-
lished by it, while not necessarily binding, provide 
opportunities for a desirable degree of uniformity 
in the interpretaton of agreements throughout the 
nation's railway systems. 
"The paramount importance of having these 
chosen representatives of railroads and unions ad-
just grievances and disputes was emphasized by our 
opinion in Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. 
S. 561. There we held, in a case remarkably similar 
to the one before us now, that the federal District 
Court in its equitable discretion should have refused 
'to adjudicate a jurisdictional dispute involving the 
railroad and two employee accredited bargaining 
agents.~ Our ground for this holding was. that the 
court 'should not have interpreted the contracts' 
but should have left this question for determination 
by the Adjustment Board, a congressionally desig-
nated agency peculiarly competent in this field. This 
reasoning equally supports a denial of power in any 
court-state as well as federal-to invade the jur-
isdiction conferred on the Adjustment Board by the 
Railway Labor Act. 
"Our holding here is not inconsistent with our 
holding in Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. 
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S. 630. Moore was discharged by the railroad. He 
could have challenged the validity of his discharge 
before the Board, seeking reinstatement and back 
pa.y. Instead he chose to accept the railroad's action 
in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to be an 
employee, and brought suit claiming damages for 
breach of contract. As we there held, the Railway 
Labor Act does not bar courts from adjudicating 
such cases. A common-law or statutory action for 
wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which 
the Board has power to provide and does not involve 
questions of future relations between the railroad 
and its other employees. If a court in handling such 
a case must consider some provision of a collective 
bargaining agreement its interpretation would of 
course have no binding effect on future interpreta-
tions by the Board. 
"'Ve hold that the jurisdiction of the Board to 
adjust grievances and disputes of the type here in-
volved is exclusive. The holding of the Moore case 
does not conflict with this decision, and no contrary 
inference should be drawn from any language in the 
Moore opinion.'' 
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals was 
thus reversed and the cause was remanded for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's. opinion. 
In Order of Railway Conductors v. Southern Railway 
Company, supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the 
United States on the same day as the Slocum case, it ap-
pears that a dispute arose between certain conductors and 
the railroad concerning the railroad's obligation under the 
collective bargaining agreement to give the conductors 
extra pay for certain services. Unable to agree through 
negotiation, the railroad brought suit for a declaratory 
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judgment seeking to have the court hold that the agreement 
did not require the claimed payments. The declaratory judg-
ment requested was. entered and the judgment affirmed 
by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The Supreme 
Court of the United States, although the same principle was 
decided the same day in the Slocum case, said as follows: 
'~For reasons set out in the Slocum case, we hold 
that the South Carolina court was without power to 
interpret the terms of this agreement and adjudicate 
the dis.pute .. We discuss this case separate.ly because 
it sharply points up the conflicts that could arise 
from state court intervention in railroad-union dis-
putes. After the railroad had sued in the state court, 
the union filed a petition for hearing and award be-
fore the Adjustment Board. The state court never-
theless proceeded to adjudicate the dispute. Sustain-
ing the state court's action would invite races of 
diligence whenever a carrier or union preferred one 
forum to the other. And if a carrier or a union could 
choose a court instead of the Board, the other party 
would be deprived of the privilege conferred by 
Section 3 First ( i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 
U. S. C. A. Section 153 First (i), which provides, 
that after negotiations have failed 'either party' may 
refer the dispute to the appropriate division of the 
Adjustment Board. The judgment * * * is re-
versed." 
The Supreme Court of the United States thus holds that 
an employe accepting his dis·charge as final may bring a 
suit in the courts, state or federal, in the nature of a com-
mon-law action for breach of contract and that there is 
nothing els.e he may maintain a suit for, based on any right 
growing out of a collective bargaining agreement between 
a carrier and its employes, and that no court has jurisdiction 
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to determine any other question under such agreements. It 
may be that a court, as was said in the Slocum case, "in 
handling a case must consider some provision of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement" in order to determine whether 
or not there has been a breach. It is difficult to see how 
a court could determine whether or not such a contract 
had been breached without examining the contract. But the 
Slocum case clearly holds that that is the full extent of the 
court's power. The instant cas~ was tried by the defendant 
on such a theory and on the authority above set out. It is 
an old-fashioned, garden-variety, common-law suit for 
breach of contract and nothing else, and the measure of dam-
ages for a breach, if found, is to be determined by the 
common-law and decisional law of damages. 
Being an ordinary common-law action for breach of 
contract, we cannot understand why it should not be tried 
as such; why the plaintiff should not be entitled to produce 
all competent material evidence available to prove the de-
fendant breached the contract; and why the defendant 
should not be permitted to produce witnesses, documentary 
evidence, and defend by introducing any competent material 
evidence available to show that it had not breached the 
contract. Instead of trying the case as a simple suit for 
breach of contract, the court, over our objection, permitted 
a transcript of unsworn testimony given at the official in-
vestigation conducted by the carrier to be introduced as sub-
stantive evidence, excluded every particle of evidence of-
fered by the defendant in defense of the charge that the 
contract had been breached, and decided the case against 
the defendant solely and exclusively upon a typewritten 
sheet of unsworn testimony. 
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The plaintiff's· entire case consisted of the introduc-
tion of the transcript of the testimony taken at the investi-
gation (Plaintiff's Ex. "A") ; a letter written by J. B. 
Hudgens, Local Chairman of the Switchmen's Union of 
North America, to Mr. R. E. Edens, defendant's superin-
tendent, dated January 14, 1946, asking reinstatement of 
the plaintiff (Plaintiff's Ex. "B") ; Superintendent Edens' 
reply to Mr. Hudgens of January 22, 1946 declining tore-
instate the plaintiff (Plaintiff's Ex. "C") ; and a letter from 
Mr. C. E. McDaniels, Acting Vice President of the Switch-
men's Union of North America, to Mr. F. C. Paulsen, Vice 
President of the defendant company, dated February 15, 
1946, again asking reinstatement of the plaintiff (Plain-
tiff's Ex. "D") . The plaintiff did not take the witness stand 
and called no other witnesses. The defendant stipulated as 
to what plaintiff's rate of pay would have been between the 
date of his dismissal and the date of trial had he not been 
discharged, having actually furnished these figures to the 
plaintiff, and also stipulated that the plaintiff could have, 
had he desired, worked steadily between the date of his dis-
missal and the date of trial, with the understanding that 
we were not admitting that plaintiff would have done so 
(Tr. 11, 12). The defendant offered no objection to any of 
plaintiff's exhibits, except Exhibit "A", the transcript of 
investigation, but as to Exhibit "A" we stated as follows: 
"Mr. Bronson: I have an objection, your Honor. 
I am not willing to stipulate that Exhibit ''A" be 
received. I am willing to stipulate as to B, C and 
D that they may be received. 
"The Court:. As to Exhibit aA", is there an ob-
jection? 
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it is hearsay and self-serving, and in a proceeding 
in a court can only be used to the extent it states an 
exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of admissions 
it may contain therein. I am wililng to stipulate 
plaintiff's proposed Exhibit "A" is a transcript of 
the proceedings had at the time of the investigation 
of Russell, with the exception of the answer to the 
last question on Page 1, which, I understand, is 
changed, which was changed. 
"The Court: \Vith the pencil mark around it? 
"Mr. Bronson: Yes, but your Honor will ob-
serve--
"The Court: You mean it was changed after the 
hearing? 
"lVIr. Bronson: Before he signed it. I don't con-
tend he had a right to." (Tr. 5.) 
The colloquy between counsel and the court indicates 
the position we now take with respect to the admission of 
this transcript. Of course it could be used at the trial the 
same as any other document that might contain written ad-
missions, and might be used by either party, if used only 
for impeachment purposes. The plaintiff was not sworn 
at the official investigation, was under no compulsion ex-
cept that of his own conscience to testify truthfully ; but 
even though he had been sworn, it would not have made 
this transcript admissible in evidence as truth of the mat-
ters therein stated, that is, as substantive evidence. 
In the case of Tennison v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 
Co., ... Mo .... , 228 S. W. 2d 718, which was decided by the 
Supreme Court of Missouri March 13, 1950, and which we 
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cited to the trial court and discussed at length (Tr. 7), the 
facts were as follows : The plaintiff had been discharged 
by his carrier employer following an investigation, for being 
intoxicated in violation of one of the defendant's operating 
rules. The contract involved provided: 
"Trainmen shall not be suspended, discharged, 
or unfavorable entries made against their records 
without just and sufficient cause. In case a train-
man is taken off of his run he shall be given a hear-
ing within five days from the time he is taken off, 
and shall be given sufficient notice in person or in 
writing, in advance, to have a trainman of his own 
choice present, who shall be permitted to examine all 
witnesses and papers pertaining to the case. Charges 
shall be specific, and he shall have the right to pro-
duce witnesses to testify in his behalf. If a train-
man is found guilty he will be notified in writing 
within five days, discipline assessed and cause. If 
held out of or removed from service unjustly, he will 
be reinstated, and paid for all time lost." 
It was stipulated that the. plaintiff was familiar with 
the rule he was charged with violating. An official investi-
gation was held at the office of the defendant's. assistant 
superintendent and several trainmen made statements there 
which were reported and transcribed. They were not sworn. 
The plaintiff testified that he was not intoxicated but that 
he was "sick." Several of the witnesses at the investiga-
tion testified that in their opinion the plaintiff was in-
toxicated, although one of the witnesses-a brakeman by 
the name of Foster-testified that he had seen the plaintiff 
at 5:45 A.M. at ·Newburg; that he had not seen him at 
any point prior to that; that he observed his actions and 
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appearance; that his speech was normal and his appearance 
was normal and there were no signs of his being intoxi-
cated. Foster was not called to testify at the· trial and the 
court received in evidence the transcript of this unsworn 
testimony of Foster's given at the investigation. The plain-
tiff recovered a judgment and the Supreme Court of 
Missouri reversed, holding that Foster's testimony at the 
official investigation was hearsay and inadmissible. The 
court said, at p. 720 : 
"This statement was, of course, hearsay; but 
plaintiff contends it was admissible as a declaration 
against interest of Foster, as a part of the records 
of defendant and also because of the contract with 
the Trainmen's Union. None of these contentions 
can be_ sustained." 
This case is as nearly in point on the facts and the law 
involved as one would ever expect to find, and the court 
further stated : 
"Plaintiff further claims that the contract with 
the union required the defendant to justify its action 
solely upon what was brought out in its investiga-
tion and argues that no other evidence can be heard 
at the triaL However, plaintiff does. not wish to so 
limit himself. Apparently he claims Foster's state-
ment is admissible on that basis; and he also claims 
that, at least, the contract authorized its use on the 
theory the agreement was that 'discipline assessed 
against an employee would be based on evidence 
brought out at an investigation held by defendant' 
as provided in the contract. Such claimed construc-
tion of the contract is unreasonable. What the con-
tract provided was that trainmen would not be dis-
charged 'without just and sufficient cause.' Methods 
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were provided for a full investigation of charges and 
hearing of the employee's side before action. How-
ever, defendant is no more precluded thereby from 
litigating in court the issue of 'just and sufficient 
cause' than is plaintiff. Both may bring in any 
competent evidence they have and obiect to any in-
competent evidence; and there is no estoppel against 
defendant because Foster was heard at the investi-
gation required by the contract. 
"Plaintiff further argues that Foster's state-
ment was not hearsay because the investigation was 
conducted by defendant and its officers had the 
right to examine him. The trouble with this conten-
tion is that it was not a proceeding before any one 
authorized to administer an oath or the power to 
compel answers, which is essential to effective cross-
examination. (Citing 5 Wigmore (3rd Ed.) 58, Sec. 
1376; 8 Wigmore 73, Sec. 2195; Bartlett v. Kansas 
City Public Service Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S. W. 2d 
7 40, 142 A. L. R. 666.) We hold that this statement 
was hearsay and that it was not admissible under 
any exception to the hearsay rule." 
To like effect is the case of Johnson v. Thompson, 
Mo. . .. , 236 S. W. 2d 1, decided. December 5, 1950. 
This was a suit by the administratrix of a deceased con-
ductor for damages for breach of a collective bargaining 
agreement in which it was claimed that the deceased had 
been discharged ¥rithout "good and sufficient cause" and 
"without a fair and impartial trial." The charge at the in-
vestigation was for violation of Rule G of the company 
which prohibited use of intoxicants. At the trial a witness 
named Ogletree, "\\"'ho was present at the official investiga-
tion, was. allowed to testify that at the investigation Johnson, 
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the conductor, denied that he was intoxicated at the time 
and place charged. The court held : 
"This testimony was clearly inadmissible (cit-
ing the Tennison case, supra). It is not admissible 
under any exception to the hearsay rule." 
The court further said: 
"Under the issues to be decided in this case this 
testimony was very important. The defense relies 
solely upon the issue that the deceased Johnson re-
ported for duty as conductor on defendant railroad 
while under the influence of intoxicants and unfit 
for service. The proof, therefore, that defendant 
denied being intoxicated at the hearing was on the 
very issue to be decided in the case, and therefore 
constituted reversible error." 
Here, again, the court is holding that the case is to 
be tried "de novo." That in the trial of the issue as to 
whether or not the defendant was guilty of the charged 
violation the unsworn testimony given at the official in-
vestigation cannot be admitted as substantive evidence of 
the facts therein stated. It is precisely what we contend for 
on this assignment of error. 
We cannot state our position any more succinctly than 
is set forth in the above opinions. A comparison of the 
agreen1ent in the instant case with that involved in the 
Tennison and Johnson cases, supra, reveals that they are 
substantially the same in those particulars involved in this 
suit. These decisions are in accord with the holding of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the Slocum case, 
supra ; that is, they have treated the situation as a simple 
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common-law action for breach of contract and held, as we 
contend for here, that there is. no reason for following 
diffe·rent procedure or applying different rules of evidence 
than are customarily applied in such actions. 
The discussion of this assignment of error may appear 
to be unnecessarily extensive to dispose of the simple prin-
ciple of evidence involved, but it seemed to us desirable to 
cover at the outset some of the law in this case in a general 
way. We assert that the trial court committed reversible 
error in admitting the transcript of the unsworn statements 
made at ,the official investigation as substantive evidence of 
the facts therein stated in the face of the objection made. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN REFUSING T'O GRANT THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT 
OF NON.SUIT. 
The only evidence offered by the plaintiff in addition 
to the transcript of the investigation, was the letter of 
January 14, 1946, from J. B. Hudgens, Local Chairman of 
the Switchmen's Union of North America, to defendant's 
superintendent, R. E. Edens, asking reinstatement of the 
plaintiff (Plaintiff's Ex. "B") ; Mr. Edens' reply thereto 
of January 22, 1946, declining plaintiff's. reinstatement 
(Plaintiff's Ex. "C") ; the letter of C. E. McDaniels, Acting 
Vice President of the SUN A, dated February 15, 1946, to 
Mr. Paulsen, the defendant's. Vice President, asking rein-
statement of the plaintiff (Plaintiff's. Ex. "D") ; in addition 
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to which we stipulated that the plaintiff, had he been so 
disposed, could have worked steadily between the date of 
his dismissal and the date of trial, and we stipulated as to 
what his rate of pay would have been had he elected to woi"k 
(Tr. 11, 12). There cannot be the slightest doubt but that 
the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case, if it is con-
cluded that it was error to admit over our objection the 
transcript of the unsworn statements made at the official 
investigation. If it was error to admit the transcript as 
substantive evidence of the matters therein stated, the 
plaintiff's case when he rested was completely destitute of 
any competent evidence showing a breach of the contract 
by the defendant and the court should have granted the 
motion for a nonsuit which was made (Tr. 13). 
Even though it was proper for the court to admit the 
transcript as substantive evidence of the facts therein 
stated, it was and is our position that nothing therein con-
tained established a prima facie case of breach of the 
contract, but on the contrary, such evidence affirmatively 
established the fact that defendant had not breached the 
agreement. 
The only charge in the complaint which plaintiff at-
tempted to prove to establish breach on the part of the 
defendant was that the defendant "wrongfully and arbi-
trarily discharged the plaintiff" and "dismissed him without 
* * * cause." Article VIII, Section 38, of the agree-
ment provides in part, and so far as pertinent, as follows : 
"Investigations: No yardman will be suspended 
or dismissed without first having a fair and im-
partial hearing and his guilt established. The man 
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whose case is under consideration may be repre-
sented by an employe of his choice, who may be a 
committeeman, who will be permitted to interrogate 
witnesses. The accused and his representative shall 
be permitted to hear the testimony of witnesses. 
Charges will be investigated within 5 days and the 
result of the investigation will be made known with-
in 3 days. 
Article XIII, Sec. 55, provides as follows : 
"(b) Yardmen taking leave of absence for a 
period of over ten days must secure and fill out 
Form 153 so the leave will be covered as a matter 
of record.'' 
It appears from the transcript of the official investiga-
tion that the plaintiff was fully aware of the rule which re-
quired him to secure and fill out Form 153 to cover an 
absence in excess of ten days. The following testimony is 
taken from the transcript, the questions by Mr. H. Caulk, 
defendant's Assistant Superintendent, the answers by the 
plaintiff: 
"Q. Do you know the rule that you will not 
absent yourself from duty ten days or over without 
written leave? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Why didn't you obtain written leave? 
"A. Because I was sick in bed at the time. 
"Q. Why didn't you ask the office for a leave 
of absence? 
"A. I called just as. soon as I got out of bed, 
soon as thA~y called me and told me I was over it." 
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At the bottom of the second page of the transcript the 
follo,ving question and answer appear, the question by Mr. 
Hudgens, Local Chairman of the SUNA, who was repre-
senting the plaintiff : 
"Q. And you talked to train desk before the 
expiration of your ten days? 
" ... L\.. No. They called me on the 31st, they called 
me out of bed at 6:30 A.M. and told me to be here 
for investigation and I was too sick and couldn't 
make it." 
Now it appears to us from the last two questions and 
answers quoted above that in spite of the fact that the 
rule required Forn1 153 to be filled out to cover an absence 
in excess of ten days, that the management, in case the 
plaintiff was sick, would have considered the rule sufficient-
ly complied with if the plaiptiff had called the office or the 
train desk on the telephone or had someone do s.o on his 
behalf. Both the examiner and the union representative, 
Hudgens, by their questions indicated that a telephone call 
by plaintiff or someone in his behalf would, in case of sick-
ness, be considered compliance with the rule, even though 
Form 153 was not filled out. When the plaintiff answered, 
"I called just as soon as I got out of bed, soon as they called 
me and told me I was over it," he was referring to the 
call he received from the company advising him to appear 
for an official investigation. There is nothing in the tran-
script ~and there was nothing in the evidence to indicate 
that anyone called him at any time and told him he "was 
over it" and he clears this up in his answer to the last ques-
tion quoted from the transcript above wherein he admits 
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that he never ·called the train desk before the expiration of 
the ten days, and never got in touch with his employer until 
his employer called him on the 31st of July, 1945. As in 
the case of 'l'ennison v. St. Louis~San Francisco R. Co., 
supra, the fact that he failed to comply with a company rule 
and regulation, of which he was fully aware, is sufficient 
to justify his dismissal in the absence of a showing that he 
was disabled from complying therewith. He gave as his 
reasons for not complying with the rule that he was "sick." 
He gave no reason as to why his wife or someone else could 
not, at his request, have notified his employer that he was 
sick and would be absent in excess of ten days, even though 
it was a fact that he was "sick." The questions and answers 
contained in the transcript may seem somewhat innocuous 
to one not fully conversant, as was said in the Slocum 
case, supra, with "railroad problems and railroad jargon." 
However, to one familiar with the on-the-ground operation 
of carrier-employe disciplinary matters, these questions and 
answers take on a great deal of significance. The examiner 
called the plaintiff's attention to the f~t that since the 
first of 1945 and up until the time he was summoned for 
an investigation he had worked much less. than half the 
time; that he had worked 16 days in January, 13 days in 
February, 12 days in March, 8 days in April, 10 days in 
May, 3 days in June, 6 days in July, although with respect 
to July it is admitted he was off work part of the time 
owing to having been scalded while off duty. The plain-
tiff did not dispute the fact that he was only working a few 
days each half. What is the significance of this? By work-
ing a few days. each half of a month this man retained his 
seniority and continued to build up seniority. Such conduct 
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left him free to occupy himself for the most part in any 
way he saw fit other than attending to his job with the 
defendant. Such conduct was seriously prejudicial to the 
rights of the defendant's other employees on the seniority 
list, and for the company to tolerate it certainly violates the 
spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement. It will be said that 
he was not charged with this offense. Assuming this to be 
true, can it be said that such admitted conduct on his part 
did not involve his credibility and furnish a reasonable 
basis for the examiner to doubt his word when he en-
deavored to explain his violation of the offense he was 
charged with by stating that he was "sick." He admitted 
that he knowingly violated the rule he was charged with 
violating. We do not think that the examiner was any 
more required to believe his explanation that he was "sick" 
than a jury would be required to believe such testimony in 
the trial of either a civil or criminal action. It should be 
again pointed out that the employe in these investigations 
cannot be required to give sworn testimony. 
The plaintiff was asked the following questions : 
"Q. I understand you own a club up the canyon. 
"A. I don't. 
"Q. You work up there don't you? 
"A. Yes." 
When it came time for the plaintiff to sign the tran-
script of the testimony he struck out the answer "yes" and 
wrote in pencil "no." We do not contend that he did not have 
a right to do this, but we do contend that the examiner had 
a right to believe that the truth was "yes" and not "no." 
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We think the foregoing question and answer has some bear-
ing on the plaintiff's credibility when he stated he was 
"sick" and the examiner had a right to consider it. Does 
any member of the court believe, or does anyone believe, 
that a few months ago when the railway system of the 
United States was so badly crippled that the federal gov-
ernment had to intervene on account of thousands of switch-
men simultaneously reporting "sick," that they were in 
fact "sick?" 
The evidence with respect to the plaintiff's working but 
a few days each half over a long period of time and ad-
mitting and later denying that he had other employment, 
has an additional significance in that the examiner was 
entitled to take it into consideration in connection with the 
assessing of discipline. 
The National Railroad Adjustment Board has con-
sistently held that the imposition of discipline will not be 
reviewed unless in their opinion the carrier's judgment was 
arbitrary or in bad faith and even though, had the Board 
been sitting in judgment originally, they would have im-
posed less drastic discipline, and that not only the charge 
under investigation but the employe's general conduct dur-
ing the period of his employment may be considered by the 
employer in imposing discipline. In Award No. 9'542 of 
the National Railroad Adjustment Board, BofLF&E v. 
Reddting Company, it was said: 
"The discipline of employes is, . necessarily, a 
prerogative of management. Imposing discipline, 
under this prerogative, involves the exercise of dis· 
cretion on the part of management, which, while 
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it may not be abused, should not be interfered with 
when reasonably exercised." 
In Award No. 10649, Engineers v. Southern Pacific, 
the Board said : 
"In a case of discipline this division interferes 
to set aside or to modify a decision only when the 
procedure adopted by the carrier has denied to an 
employe a fundamental right or when the decision 
imposing the discipline is manifestly unjust." 
In Award No. 13356, Trainmen v. Union Pacific, it was 
said: 
"The carrier duly charged its employe, one 
Price, with violation of certain operating rules and 
upon hearing thereof said employe was found to 
have violated said rules, and the discipline ass.essed 
was dismissal. The credibility of the witnesses and 
the weight to be given their testimony is determined 
by the hearing officer and in the absence of a show-
ing his judgment was arbitrary or capricious, it 
will not be disturbed." 
In Award No. 12883, Conductors and Trainmen v. 
Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf, the Board said: 
"The severity of the discipline imposed is not 
subject to determination here." 
The Railroad Adjustment Board has also consistently 
held that in assessing discipline an employe's past record 
may be taken into consideration. In Award No. 1599, 
Porters v. The Pullman Company, the Board said: 
"In disciplinary matters it is not only proper, 
but essential, in the interest of justice, to take past 
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record into consideration. What might be just and 
fair discipline to an employe whose past record is 
good, might, and usually would, be utterly inadequate 
discipline for an employe with a bad record." 
In Award No. 4229, Porters v. The Pullman Company, 
a disciplinary action for insubordination, the Board said: 
"The organization also objected to the consid-
eration or review of a past incident of insubordina-
tion by claimant. We have said before that in fixing 
the penalty it is proper to consider the past record of 
an employe." (Citing Award 1599.) 
In Award No. 1·2427, O·RC v. Western Pacific Railroad 
Company, the Board took into consideration the claimant's 
past good record, ameliorating the discipline assesed on 
account thereof. The Board said : 
"In view of the claimant's past record and the 
circumstances under which the violation occurred, 
we think the discipline imposed was excessive in 
considering the nature of the offense. In view of the 
length of time the claimant has been out of service 
by reason of the sentence imposed, we think he has 
been sufficiently disciplined and that he should now 
be immediately reinstated with seniority rights un-
impaired but without pay for time lost." 
In A ward No. 12429; Brotherhood of Railroad TraiJn,. 
men v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, the Board said: 
"There is. ample evidence in the record to sustain 
the carrier's finding that claimant was guilty of 
violating its operating rules as charged. Such 
finding authorized the carri.er to impose discipline. 
Of course, this authority must not be abused by im-
posing excessive discipline and thus arbitrarily take 
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from such employe rights which he had earned under 
the agreement. But this does not mean that the 
carrier must in every instance impose the same 
sentence for like or similar offenses. What it does 
mean is that the sentence imposed in each case 
should be reasonable, that is, just and proper, con-
sidering the nature of the offense and the past rec-
ord of the employe involved .. " 
In Award No. 13142, BofLF&E v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Company, the Board said: 
"Past record, good or bad, may be taken into 
consideration in fixing the discipline." 
The above quotations could be multiplied by the score 
but the above awards are all recent and reflect the consist-
ent attitude of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. 
We do not say that the opinions of the Railroad Adjustment 
Board are binding on our courts, but when the Supreme 
Court of the United States has said that Congress placed 
exclusive jurisdiction in the Railroad Adjustment Board to 
interpret collective bargaining agreements between car-
riers and employes, their opinions and interpretations, it 
seems to us, should carry considerable persuasion with the 
courts. 
The Railway Labor Act was never designed to interfere 
with the discretion of a carrier in selecting its own employes 
or in discharging them. There reposes in the carrier full 
discretion to discharge any of its employes at any time and 
for any cause except as it may be inhibited by some pro-
vision in the collective bargaining agreement. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
In Texas, N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and 
Steamship Clerks·, 281 U. S. 548, 74 L. Ed. 1034 at 1046, 50 
S. Ct. 427, it was said: 
"The Railway Labor Act of 1926 does not in-
terfere with the normal exercise of the right of the 
carrier to select its employes or to discharge them. 
The statute is not aimed at this right of the em-
ployers but at the interference with the right of em-
ployes to have representatives of their own choos-
ing." 
In Virginia Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 
300 U. S. 515, 81 L. Ed. 781, 57 S. Ct. 592, the Supreme 
Court again said, referring to the provisions of the Rail-
way Labor Act: 
"They do not interfere with the normal exercise 
of the right of the carrier to select its employes or 
to discharge them." 
In Beeler v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 169 F. 2d 557, 
the court said: 
"The act does not interfere with the normal 
right of the employer to select its employes or dis-
charge them or to create or abolish positions, so 
long as it does not impair the collective bargaining 
process." 
It is a matter of general knowledge, at least among all 
of those who have had the slightest contact with the Rail-
road Adjustment Board, that before that tribunal the em-
ploye fares exceedingly well. Perhaps we should not ques-
tion the plaintiff's election to sue for damages in our 
courts., which he has a right to do, but he originally started 
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out to secure not only damages, but an order for reinstate-
ment at the hands of the court. It is extremely rare for an 
employe to forego the advantage he has before the Board in 
a controversy \vith the employing carrier. We do not be-
lieve this court has ever had before it a case of this. nature. 
\Ve feel justified in assuming that plaintiff and his counsel 
\Vere pessimistic about selling the Railroad Adjustment 
Board the "bill of goods" they so successfully pawned off 
on the trial court in this case. 
In denying defendant's motion for a nonsuit we under-
stood the court to indicate that even though the plaintiff 
was guilty of the charge, it did not involve a "substantial" 
breach and should not be considered a breach of the contract 
warranting any disciplinary action (Tr. 15). We do not 
think such a construction by the court was warranted and 
before the case was concluded we offered to prove that the 
rule had been generally enforced against employes who 
violated it, and we offered to prove that Mr. Hudgens, the 
Local Chairman of the Switchmen's Union of North Amer-
ica, had himself been dismissed from the service of the 
company for a violation of this very rule which plaintiff 
was charged with violating. The court refused to permit 
the proof, which was error, if the reason for denying the 
motion for nonsuit was because he did not consider plain-
tiff's violation of Rule 55 (b) a substantial breach. And 
further, in this connection, we do not think that the court 
has a right and we are sure the Railroad Adjustment Board 
would not think it had the right, to determine whether the 
breach of any given operating rule was or was not sufficient 
to warrant discipline by the carrier, but that this is a pre-
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rogative to be exercised in the- discretion of the management. 
Absenteeism is of peculiar concern to the railroad industry. 
No rule is more strictly enforced. The necessities of the 
business require it. The defendant is a public utility charged 
by government fiat with maintaining the "free and unin-
terrupted flow of interstate commerce." The absence of a 
very few employes at any given point without their giving 
notice to the carrier so as to enable it to provide other em-
ployes, can cripple operations, delay trains and cause all 
manner of disturbance, to the detriment of the public 
generally. The rule must be enforced against the engineer 
of a streamline train as well as against a switchman, it 
must be and is enforced against all employes whose duties 
involve the movement of trains. 
We think the plaintiff's evidence showed a failure on 
his part, without any excuse therefor, to comply with what 
he knew to be an important rule of the company governing 
his employment. Even had he been "sick" he was not so 
disabled that he could not have complied with the rule in 
question or notified his employer of his intended absence 
from duty. The contract makes no exception for failure to 
comply with the rule on account of sickness. If an employe 
was unconscious, or in jail, or subject to any condition 
where it was really impossible for him to give notice of his 
absence, no one would try to enforce this provision of the 
contract against him. Such a situation would rarely arise. 
We know from common experience that an employe can and 
does let the "boss" know when he is. unable to come to work. 
We think that the trial court committed reversible 
error in refusing to grant defendant's motion for a nonsuit, 
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even though it is held that the court was justified in decid-
ing the case solely on the unsworn testimony taken at the 
official investigation. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING 
THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT· HAD 
BREACHED THE COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING AGREEMENT SOLELY UPON THE 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE UNSWORN TESTI-
MONY GIVEN AT THE OFFICIAL INVESTI-
GATION; IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVI-
DENCE PROFFERED BY THE DEF'ENDANT 
TO SHOW JUSTIFICATION FOR PLAINTIFF'S 
DISMISSAL; AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT PLAIN-
TIFF'S TESTIMONY CONTAINED IN SAID 
TRANSCRIPT WAS F AL.S,E. 
Our contention in connection with the first phase of 
this assignment of error is that the court should have per-
mitted, as was said in the Tennison case, supra, bo:th sides 
"to bring in any evidence they have and object to any in-
competent evidence," in determining whether or not the 
defendant had breached the contract in dismissing the plain-
tiff. In other words, the trial court on the authority not. 
only of the Tennison and Johnson cases, but of the Slocum 
case, in trying a simple common-law action for breach of 
a contract, should have permitted an investigation de nov·o 
to determine whethe~r or not the defendant. was warranted 
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in dismissing the plaintiff from service. The position we 
contend for under the first phase of this assignment of 
error is simply another facet of the assignment of error 
discussed under Point I and the cases there cited and the 
argument there made are equally applicable at this point. 
We will not prolong this brief by unnecessa~ry repetition, 
and we incorporate herein what was said on this. matter 
in our discussion under Point I. 
To show justification for the plaintiff's dismissal we 
offered to prove that during the four years beginning with 
the 18th of August, 1941, up to the 1st of August, 1945, when 
the plaintiff was. dismissed, he could have, had he so de-
sired, worked every day ; and owing to the fact that the 
war was in progress could have frequently worked a double 
shift. That, in fact, during this period of time his earnings 
for the year 1941 were $888.00; 19,42, $2,449.27; 1943, 
$2,308.44; 1944, $1,622.71; and the first seven months. of 
1945 preceding his. dismissal a total of $431.71. It thus 
appears that his total earnings. for a period of four years 
aggregated $7,700.13 (Tr. 34, 35, 52, 53). We offered to 
show that during the ten day period that he was. off the 
job without having notified his employer by filling out 
Form 153 or notifying his employer of his absence in any 
other way, that he was. in fact working and operating a 
"beer joint" in Ogden Canyon, and to prove that when he 
testified at the official investigation with respect to this 
matter that his. testimony was. false (Tr. 37). We. also 
offered to prove that during this period of time he was 
not "down in bed" as he said; that he did not consult a 
doctor until the seventh day after he laid off; that he then 
walked into the. doctor's office complaining of an earache, 
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saw the doctor only on that one occasion, and tha;t after 
he had received notice that he was dismissed from service 
he went to Dr. Stratford, who had treated him on the one 
occasion, who did not then know that he had been dismissed, 
and got a release indicating that he was able to work (Tr. 
37). We did prove, without objection, that the witness 
Combe, for whom the plaintiff had worked as a bartender 
intermittently from the year 1941 until May of 1950, was 
the owner of the Pine View Inn in Ogden ·Canyon, and that 
the establishment was leased in the name of the plaintiff's 
wife, Mrs. Russell, as lessee ( Tr. 32) . We were ready and 
we offered to prove that the plaintiff himself was, at the 
time he claimed to be sick during the ten day period which 
was the subject of investigation, actually operating and 
working at this establishment and had been operating the 
same for many months prior thereto. We also offered to 
prove that Dr. Keith Stratford, the company doctor, al-
though he gave Mr. Russell a "return to work release," sub-
sequent to Russell's dismissal and without knowledge there-
of, when Russell came to his office and requested it, would 
nonetheless testify that Russell, in spite of the complaint 
he made when he visited the doctor seven days. after he 
laid off-Dn July 21, 1945-was. able to work and perform 
all the duties of his employment, and that during the ten 
.......... days the plaintiff was. off without leave (which was. the 
subject of investigation) he was able to wo~k and dis-
charge the duties of his position ( Tr. 53). 
All of the foregoing offers of proof were rejected by 
.... ;;;;;;;;;;;;.. the court. In this connection, the admission contained in 
::::::::::::::::: Mr. C. E. McDaniels.' letter to Mr. F. ~c. Paulsen dated May 
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14, 1946 (Defendant's Ex. "3") that the plaintiff did, in 
fact, give false testimony at the, investigation held August 
3, 1945, which culminated in his dismissal, should have had 
great weight. 
We submit that the court committed reversible error 
in refusing to permit the defendant to make the above proof. 
We think under the holdings of the Supreme Court of the 
United States designating this type of action as a simple 
suit for breach of contract and the holding in the Tennison 
and Johnson cases, supra, that we were entitled to offer 
such evidence as would justify our dismissal of Russell, 
and if we are right in this proposition, we do not think it 
necessary to belabor the matter further. It seems to us 
obvious that the evidence we offered to produce was an1ply 
sufficient to justify the defendant company in dismissing 
the plaintiff and we should have been permitted to intro-
duce it. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN ASSESSING AND FIXING 
DAMAGES: 
(a) IN REFUSING TO ALLOW AS MITIGA-
TION OF DAMAGES THE AMOUNT OF 
MONEY EARNED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN 
OTHER EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN THE 
DATE OF HIS DISMISSAL BY THE DEFEND-
ANT AND THE DATE OF TRIAL; 
(b) IN HOLDING THAT THE MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CON-
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TRACT WAS THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF 
WOULD HAVE EARNED HAD HE WORKED 
EACH AND EVERY DAY AT HIS FORMER 
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT 
BETWEEN THE RECEIPT BY DEFEND-
ANT OF HIS APPLICATION FOR REIN-
STATEMENT AND THE DAY OF TRIAL, 
SEPTEMBER 7, 1950, A PERIOD IN EXCESS 
OF FIVE YEARS; 
(c) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE DEFEN-
DANT TO PROVE THAT THE P'LAINTIFF 
DURING HIS EMP·LOYMENT BY THE DE-
FENDANT WORKED ONLY A PO·RTION OF 
THE TIME ALTHOUGH 8T'EADiY EMPLOY-
MENT WAS A V AIL.ABLE TO HIM. 
(a) The defendant pleaded affirmatively that any 
damage plaintiff might have suffered could have been miti-
gated by the plaintiff and averted or avoided, in whole or 
in part, by plaintiff's securing remunerative employment 
after his dismissal other than employment by the defend-
ant (R. 6). 
We believe it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
prove his damages, if any, occasioned by the alleged breach 
of the contract by defendant, the same as is required of the 
plaintiff in any other common-law action for contract 
breach. There is not one word of testimony in the entire 
record to indicate what plaintiff's damage if any was, and 
so far as the record shows, he may have earned at other 
..... employment in excess of what he might have been able to 
l))' earn between the date of his dismissal and the date of trial 
uu 
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had he continued in the employ of the defendant. We were 
able to locate several parties for whom the plaintiff had 
worked between the date of his dismissal and the date of 
trial and served these employers with a subpoena duces 
tecum. Their undisputed evidence showed that the plain-
tiff between the date of his dismissal and the date of trial 
earned at other employment the sum of $7,774.39. The court 
indicated at the outset that he considered the evidence im-
material, but because the testimony was to be short and the 
witnesses were all in court wih their records, consented, at 
our solicitation, to hear the testimony and reserve a ruling 
(Tr. 19). In the decision the court completely disregarded 
this showing, refusing to mitigate the damages in the 
amount proved to have been earned by the plaintiff in 
other employment. 
The witness, H. B. McEwan, an accountant ·who kept 
the books for the H&A Annex, a beer dispensary, testified 
that between March 15 and October 15, 1947, the plaintiff 
for his services as a bartender was paid the sum of $1583.80 
(Tr. 19, 20). 
The witness David H. Hadley, who operated a sand and 
gravel business, produced in court his business records 
showing that the plaintiff for his services as a truck driver 
was paid in the month of November, 1947, $156.67; in De-
cember, 1947, $152.04; in January, 1948, $56.05; in March, 
1948, $99.24; in April, 1948, $298.52; in May, 1948, $228.33, 
and in June, 1948, $120.29, an aggregate of $1111.14. These 
records are identified as defendant's Exhibit "1", and it 
was admitted that the records were kept in the regular 
course of the witness' business (Tr. 24) (Defendant's Ex. 
"1"). 
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The 'vitness Earl W. Folkman, manager of Dr. Pepper 
Bottling "rorks in Ogden, testified that from October, 
1948 to the date of trial his company paid the plaintiff 
$4,879.45 for services as a "driver salesman" (Tr. 27, 28). 
The witness Frank Combe, owner of the Marion Bar, 
testified that he was a personal friend of the plaintiff and 
had paid him the sum of $200.00 for tending bar between 
December, 1949 and June, 1950 (Tr. 28). He also testified 
that the plaintiff had tended bar for him during the years 
1942, 1943 and 1944, sometimes at night and sometimes 
in the day, which was during the period of time the plain-
tiff was employed by the defendant as a switchman (Tr. 29, 
30). He could not or would not produce any intelligible 
business records. 
The aggregate amount of the earnings as shown above 
constitutes the figure of $7,774.39 shown to have been earn-
ed in other employment by the plaintiff. 
We think that the failure of the court to take into ac-
count the monies earned by the plaintiff in other employ-
ment was to do something more than to make the plaintiff 
"whole." The damages of $18,892.76 which the court award-
ed and the amount shown to have been earned in other 
employment brings the plaintiff's reward to the sum of 
$26,667.15 for the period of five years following his dis.-
missal. This is not damages, but a penalty and one the 
trial court had no right whatsoever to exact from the de-
fendant in this proceeding. The plaintiff Russell, we of-
fered to prove, earned only the sum of $7,700.13 during the 
--------- entire four year period he was employed by the defendant 
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(Tr. 35). As stated, he introduced not one word of testi-
mony or· other evidence tending to establish his damage, 
if any. 
It is. an elementary rule of the general law of damages 
that one must exercise reasonable care to prevent the en-
hancement of any damages caused by wrongful act. This 
rule applies in suits for breach of contracts of employ-
ment. In 56 C. J. S., Section 59, it is stated: 
"A discharged servant cannot lie by unemployed 
for the remainder of the term, and then claim full 
compensation; he is bound to make the best use of 
his time, and seek other employment. Where the 
amount received in other employment equals or ex-
ceeds that contracted for, there can be no recovery." 
In 56 C. J. S., Section 28 (120), it is said with respect 
to actions for breach of a contract of employment: 
"General rules as to trial and judgment apply 
to actions by an employe against his employer for 
breach of his rights under a contract between the 
employer and the employe's organization. * * * 
"The measure of damages for breach of an em-
ployment contract is the amount an employe would 
have received as wages had the contract been per-
formed, less the amount he has earned during the 
period." 
In 35 Am. J ur ., Master and Servant, Section 57, it is 
said: 
. "It is a principle of the law of damages that all 
facts and circumstances which go to show a reduc-
tion in the amount necessary to compensate the 
plaintiff or account for injuries sustained by the 
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breach of a contract may be shown in mitigation of 
damages. * * * The defendant employer may 
show in reduction of the damages the fact that the 
employe actually engaged in other profitable em-
ployment." 
This is the generally applied common-law rule of 
damages for breach of a contract of employment, and it is 
for this reason we think the court should at least have given 
consideration to the amount of money it was shown without 
dispute to have been earned by the plaintiff in other em-
ployment. It is further stated in the citation of American 
Jurisprudence, supra : 
"It is a well settled principle that upon the 
breach of a contract of employment calling for per-
sonal services by the wrongful discharge of the em-
ploye, the latter is required to use reasonable efforts 
to obtain other employment of like nature for the 
purpose of lessening or minimizing the damages. In 
short, in an action by a wrongfully discharged em-
ploye by reason of the breach of his contract of em-
ployment, the defendant employer may reduce the 
amount of damages recoverable by whatever the 
plaintiff has earned or by reasonable diligence could 
have earned in other employment subsequent to his 
discharge.'' 
(b) and (c) At the request of plaintiff's counsel the 
defendant furnished to the plaintiff a tabulation showing 
the number of days plaintiff could have worked between 
the 27th day of January, 1946 and the date of trial, had he 
so desired, and stipulated as to the rate of pay he would have 
received, there having been three increases of pay on the job 
plaintiff would have held during such period of time. In 
so stipulating, however, we specifically indicated that we 
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would not admit that plaintiff would have worked every 
day (365 days a year) during such period of time, and al-
though there was no evidence that he would have done so 
' the court in fixing the damages and allowing him the sum of 
$18,892.76, assumed that he would. We offered to prove 
what the plaintiff's earnings were between the years 1941 
and 1945 and to prove that during such period of time he 
only worked a portion of the time, although he would have 
been able to work steadily (Tr. 35, 36). For this purpose we 
offered as a witness the defendant's head timekeeper, Mr. 
D. B. Porter, and the company's books. The court sustained 
objections to this evidence and rejected our offer of proof. 
When asked what significance this evidence had and what 
we claimed therefor, we stated to the court: 
MR. BRONSON: "I should think your Honor 
would want to know what the probability would be 
following August 1945, the date of dismissal, of his 
working 7 days. a week, 30 or 31 days. a month 
* * * which is what they are endeavoring to get 
your Honor to hold. I think it is proper for you, the 
Court, to draw inferences from the fact that he 
only worked half the time ·for four years and he 
would not work 7 days a week for the past five 
years. In conclusion, the next thing I propose to 
show was the exact days he was off. I make the offer 
of proof at this time and your Honor can rule on it." 
(Tr. 36). 
We reassert the above and we contend t;hat it was a 
proper matter for the court to take into consideration; that 
the court had no right to ignore such evidence and make an 
assumption, not based on any evidence, that the plaintiff 
would have worked every single day for a period of five 
years following his dismissal. 
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The contract (Plaintiff's Ex. "E") provided in Article 
VIII, Section 38 : 
"In case dismissal is found to be unjust, yard-
man shall be reinstated and paid for all time lost 
* * *" . 
Under no circumstances, even in a hearing before the 
National Railroad Adjustment Board, would the plaintiff 
be entitled to "all time lost" unless he was "reinstated." I 
expect that it will be argued that the trial court thought 
from the evidence that the plaintiff should be reinstated and 
that the court refrained from reinstating the plaintiff 
solely because under the Slocum case, supra, it was without 
jurisdiction to make such an order; that because the court 
thought that the plaintiff should be reinstated he was en-
- titled to "all time lost." But the Slocum case definitely did 
not hold that courts have full jurisdiction in suits involving 
railway collective bargaining agreements except to· reinstate 
~ an employe. The case holds that courts have no jurisdiction 
_ other than to try a simple common-law action for damages 
for breach of contract; that they cannot interpret the con-
: tract; that they cannot pass on the question of whether or not 
:- an employe is entitled to reinstatement, or to any other 
::: benefits under the contract. They have jurisdiction to de-
~-
cide ( 1) was the contract breached, ( 2) if so, the damages 
_ if any, and nothing else. And they have absolutely no right 
· to apply any other principles in assessing damages than 
~ 
those that have always been recognized in courts of law in 
-~ 
·;~ 
-', 
simple contract actions. 
In Eubanks v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., (Texas) 
59 S. W. 2d 825, in which a brakeman brought suit for 
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damages for an alleged breach by the defendant carrier of 
a collective bargaining agreement which provided that 
where the employe was. unjustly discharged he should be 
paid "for all time lost," the court said: 
"The contract provides that, if the employee 
is unjustly discharged, he shall have pay 'for all 
time lost.' The trial court seems to hold that this 
provision was intended to set aside the common-law 
rule as to the measure of damages for breach of this 
contract and substitute a different measure fixed by 
the contract itself. The trial court then seems to 
hold that the measure fixed by the contract would 
not charge Eubanks. with money actually earned 
during the time between his discharge and the j udg-
ment, and would not obligate him in any way to 
mitigate his damages by making a reasonable ef-
fort to secure other employment. The Court of Civil 
Appeals holds, in effect, that the provision in the 
contract requiring the railway company to pay him 
'for all time lost' means nothing more than to ob-
ligate the railway company to pay for the loss of 
earnings. In other words, we understand the opinion 
of the Court of Civil Appeals to hold that the com-
mon-law rule should be applied in measurifng the 
damages. We approve this holding." 
The provisions of the contract under discussion cannot, 
in our opinion, be considered a stipulation for liquidated 
damages for the reason that it is inextricably connected 
with reinstatement, and the payment for "all time lost" is 
predicated upon and can only be ordered upon reinstate· 
ment. The Board itself frequently orders reinstatement 
without ordering the carrier to pay the employe for "time 
lost." It is therefore not considered as a stipulation for 
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liquidated damages in case of breach even by the Board 
itself. What the plaintiff's dam~ges were, if any he had, 
we do not know. There was no evidence on the matter and 
it is impossible for this court or anyone else to ascertain 
from the record in this case whether plaintiff was damaged 
by his discharge or not. So far as the record shows he 
may have earned in excess of what he would have earned 
had he continued to be employed by the defendant. It was 
plaintiff's burden to prove his damages, not the defend-
ant's. 
We submit that there was an utter failure of proof of 
damages on the part of the plaintiff and that it was re-
versible error for the trial court to assess damages against 
the defendant in any amount, and certainly reversible error 
to assess damages in the manner the court did. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE 
THAT IT WAS POWERLESS TO REINSTAT·E 
THE PL ... L\.INTIFF IN HIS EMPLOYMENT 
AFTER THE EXPIRATION O·F SIX MONTH·S. 
FROM THE DATE OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT 
THE CONSENT. OF THE BROTHER.HOOD OF 
·RAILROAD TRAINMEN, AND IN EXCLUDING 
DEFENDANT'S PROFFER OF EVIDENCE TO 
SHOW THAT THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAIL-
ROAD TRAINMEN WAS NEVER AT ANY 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
54 
TIME WILLING TO CONSENT TO PLAIN-
TIFF'S REINSTATEMENT BY THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
In connection with this assignment of error Article 
VIII, Section 38, of the agreement provides: 
"Reinstatement will not be permitted after the 
expiration of six months from date of dismissal, un-
less agreeable to the management and the general 
committee, except that a case pending with either 
the B.R. T. or O.R.C. at the expiration of the six 
month period, will not be prejudiced. Where the 
yardman involved has been out of service six months 
or less it will not be obligatory to consult the com-
mittees representing these classes of employes in 
considering the case for reinstatement." 
The six months period following Rus.sell's dismissal 
expired February 3, 1946. The fact that the agreement 
provides that before the expiration of six months "it shall 
not be obligatory" to consult the union, clearly indicates the 
intention of the parties that it is obligatory to have the 
union's consent after six months, unless the employe's case 
is then pending with the "General Committee." At the ex-
piration of six months there was. nothing pending with the 
defendant company from the BRT or ORC. On January 22, 
1946 Mr. Edens wrote to Mr. Hudgens, Local Chairman of 
the Switchmen in Ogden, declining to reinstate the plain-
tiff. There the matter rested until February 15, 1946, when 
Mr. C. E. McDaniels, of the Switchmen's Union, not of the 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, made another applica· 
tion for reinstatement. Mr. Edens testified that the defend-
ant had not at any time received any application or peti-
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tion from the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen to rein-
state or to reconsider Mr. Russell's dismissal (Tr. 41). 
That no application before the expiration of the six months 
period \Yas ever made by anyone other than Mr. Hudgens, 
Local Chairman of the Switchmen (Tr. 42). There was thus 
no case pending with the BofRT or ORC at the expiration of 
six months following dismissal. Therefore, without the 
consent of the "General Committee," which we offered to 
prove was the General Committee of the Brotherhood of 
Railroad Trainmen, the sole bargaining agent for yardmen, 
but were precluded from so doing, the defendant could not 
have reinstated the plaintiff had it desired to do so. We 
offered to prove, and again were prohibited from doing so, 
that there never was a time either before or after the ex-
piration of six months following dismissal when the "Gen-
eral Committee" was willing to consent to the defendant 
reinstating this employe. 
Mr. H. C. Beckett was called by the defendant and 
testified that he was the Local Chairman or Local Repre-
sentative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in Ogden, 
and had been for some 15 years (Tr. 43). That he was 
familiar with the contract which is involved in this suit 
(Tr. 44), and, in fact, it appears that he signed the same 
on behalf of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen when 
it was negotiated and entered into with the defendant com-
pany. He testified that the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men was the sole and exclusive bargaining agency for the 
men working in the Ogden Yard and handled their griev-
ances (Tr. 44, 45). He testified that neither Mr. Russell in 
· · · person, or by or through anyone else, ever requested the 
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BofRT to petition the defendant company for reinstatement 
(Tr. 45, 46). We then offered to prove a vital and essential 
matter in support of this affirmative defense, to-wit, that 
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen never were at any 
time agreeable to having the defendant reinstate the plain-
tiff, to which the court sustained plaintiff's objection (Tr. 
47). We also offered to prove that the BofRT up to and 
including the date of trial were unwilling to consent to the 
defendant reinstating the plaintiff and this offer of proof 
was rejected (Tr. 46). 
Ther~ being nothing pending from the BofRT or the 
ORC at the expiration of six months. following plaintiff's 
dismissal, and the General Committee of the BofRT not 
being willing to consent to plaintiff's reinstatement after the 
six months period, the defendant could not have reinstated 
the plaintiff, had it desired, without breaching the contract 
as to each and every yardman employe in the Ogden Yards 
who would be set down one place on the seniority roster by 
reason of such reinstatement. It would have given rise to a 
cause of action for damages against defendant by each and 
every one of such yardmen employes. The plaintiff is 
bound by this provision of the contract; it is binding on the 
carrier, and it exists for the benefit of all the employes 
covered by the agreement. The plaintiff has. only such 
rights as are given to him by the contract in question, which 
was negotiated by the BofRT, sole bargaining agent for all 
yardmen. The plaintiff is bound to proceed in securing his 
rights· under this contract in accordance with the procedure 
agreed upon therefor by the carrier and the bargaining 
agency. To have reinstated the plaintiff in the face of op-
position :tJy the BofRT might easily have precipitated a 
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strike-one of the main evils the Railway Labor Act and 
collective bargaining agreements in the railroad industry 
are designed to prevent. Nothing is more zealously guarded 
by employes than their seniority, and rightly so. Reduction 
in seniority means a loss of earnings, less agreeable work, 
less favorable working shifts, and danger of being cut off 
upon a reduction of forces. It is easy to understand why 
not even the Union wanted Russell reinstated. Employes 
quite naturally resent one who secures unto himself all the 
benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, prejudicing 
the other employes on the property by standing in the way 
of their advancement on the seniority roster, when it is 
done by one who will not protect his job, works. only part 
time, and engages in some profitable outside business or em-
ployment. Russell clung tenaciously to a job in the railroad 
industry during the war years by working only part time. 
He retained his seniority and built it up in an industry that 
was crying for men to work to keep military supplies mov-
ing to the west coast, and in an industry whose employes 
were exempt from military service so that they might help 
maintain the transportation system so essential to winning 
the war. We were prepared to show that the plaintiff, in-
stead of protecting his job, engaged in the profitable busi-
ness of selling a scarce commodity and one in great demand 
at that time, to-wit, beer, in a community that was con-
gested with military personnel and war-industry workers. 
It was for such reasons that the BofRT would not consent 
to plaintiff's reinstatement, as they had a right to, and not 
because (as we expect will be claimed) the plaintiff was not 
a member of the Trainmen's Union, but of the Switchmen's 
Union. 
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We submit that in refusing to reinstate the plaintiff 
when his case was not pending with either the BofRT or 
the ORC at the expiration of six months following dismissal, 
and when the General Committee of the BofRT was unwill-
ing after the expiration of six months to consent to defend-
ant reinstating plaintiff, that the defendant was maintai11r 
ing the imtegrity of the agreement it had with its employes 
rather than breaching the same, and on this affirmative de-
fense alone the defendant was entitled to a judgment of no 
cause of action at the hands of the court. We submit that 
the showing made on this point warrants this, court in re-
manding the case with instructions to enter a judgment of 
no cause of action in favor of the defendant. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS WITHOUT ANY 
RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR 
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CO~ 
TRACT, OR IF SUCH RIGHT AT ANY TIME 
DID EXIST, IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS FORE·CLOSED AND ESTOP-
PED FROM ASSERTING THE SAME. 
Attached to plaintiff's application of January 14, 1946 
for reinstatement, filed in his behalf by J. B. Hudgens, 
Local Chairman of the Switchmen, is Russell's written 
signed authorization to the SUNA to represent him in 
handling his grievance with the defendant company (Plain· 
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tiff's Ex. "B"). This authority is likewise attached to the 
letter of C. E. lVIcDaniels, Acting Vice President of the 
SUNA, dated February 15, 1946, asking reinstatement and 
addressed to Mr. F. C. Paulsen, Vice President of the de-
fendant company (Plaintiff's Ex. "D"). This "designation" 
or "authorization" by the plaintiff of the SUN A was ad-
mitted by plaintiff (Tr. 4, 5). It is as broad and extensive 
as can be imagined, the plaintiff giving the SUNA full 
authority to represent him in any way they saw fit and 
consenting to be bound by their disposition of the case. It 
was a commitment made by the plaintiff to the defendant 
company that it might deal with any officer or representa-
tive of the SUN A the same as though they were dealing with 
the plaintiff in person; it was a commitment made to the 
defendant that the plaintiff would be bound by any disposi-
tion of this case that might be made by an officer or repre-
sentative of the SUNA, or agreed upon by such officer and 
the defendant company. This communication, addressed to 
the defendant, says : 
"I, the undersigned, hereby authorize the 
Switchmen's Union of North America and any and 
all of its officers and representatives to represent 
and act in my * * * place and stead, as. my 
* * * agent and representative in the prosecu-
tion of grievance claim, reading : (statement of the 
claim) against The Ogden Union Railway and De-
pot Company, and I * * * authorize the Switch-
men's Union of North America and any and all of 
its officers and representatives to represent and act 
as my * * * agent and representative in my 
* * * place and stead, in all further prosecution 
of the afore quoted grievance, * * * and I auth-
orize and empower the Switchmen's Union of North 
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America and any and all of its officers and repre-
sentatives to negotiate, adjust and dispose of the 
herein quoted grievance claim in any manner 
* * * 
(Sgd.) W. B. Russell." 
This is perhaps as good a place as any to point out 
that the substance of the rambling, erroneous, and at times 
incomprehensible presentation by Hudgens in his applica-
tion for reinstatement of January 14, 1946, and by Mc-
Daniels in his application for reinstatement of February 15, 
1946, is of no assistance or consequence in the disposition 
of this case. The only significance of these two "submis-
sions" or letters is that it is shown thereby that the SUNA, 
through Local Chairman Hudgens and later through Acting 
Vice President McDaniels, were representing the plaintiff 
pursuant to their authorization by the plaintiff. 
We desire at this point to invite the court's. attention 
to the defendant's Exhibit "3", a letter written by plain-
tiff's duly authorized representative, C. E. McDaniels, to 
the vice president of the defendant company, dated May 
14, 1946. We also want to point out that this letter was the 
final and last communication passing between the parties 
from the time it was delivered until several years. later 
when plaintiff filed the present suit. A careful examination 
of this letter (Defendant's Ex. "3"), reveals. in the second 
paragraph thereof that Mr. McDaniels and Mr. Paulsen 
during negotiations had been in conference over the case 
and that Mr. McDaniels had agreed to conduct an examina-
tion into the defendant's charge that Russell did not tell 
the truth at the investigation which resulted in his dis-
missal. McDaniels then states in the next and last para-
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graph of this letter that the "investigation has been com-
pleted" and ··'We are withdra~ving the grievance and the 
case is closed." Is there any doubt that the investigation 
disclosed that Russell did not tell the truth at the investiga-
tion? Is there any doubt that this is an admission by Russell 
that he falsified at the investigation? Is there any doubt 
that the case was at this point finally and conclusively dis-
posed of, by the plaintiff's stipulation that he had no valid 
claim against the defendant, by his advice to the defendant 
that he was "withdrawing the grievance," and that the "case 
was closed," in view of the full and complete authority Mc-
Daniels had from the plaintiff Russell ''to negotiate, adjust 
and dispose of the grievance in any manner''? This was the 
plaintiff speaking and it is as though he spoke to the de-
fendant in these words, "I did not tell you the truth at the 
investigation. The charge made against me was true and 
I now admit it. I withdraw the claim I have made against 
you and you may consider the matter closed." 
There can be no claim made here that this was not bind-
ing on the plaintiff. He had never revoked the authority 
of McDaniels, although he had the right to do so at any 
time. He did not take the stand at the trial and did not call 
McDaniels to repudiate, explain or modify the clear meaning 
of this letter in any way. It cannot be said that because 
McDaniels in his letter also said that the withdrawal was 
....... "without preJudice to our contentions and position as ex-
,...... pressed in our letter of February 15, 1946, and without 
.. establishing a precedent as to adjustment of future griev-
.. ances possessing dissimilar facts," that such statement was 
, a limitation of any kind, or a reservation of a right in the 
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plaintiff to sue the defendant company years later. Mr. 
McDaniels as the Acting Vice President of the Switchmen's 
Union of North America is. accustomed to negotiating with 
management in labor relations cases. He obviously is saying 
in the above quoted portion of his letter that he is. notre-
linquishing the "princi pies" contended for in his applica-
tion for reinstatement dated February 15, 1946, as applied 
in a proper case ; that he does not want his admission of 
the invalidity of Russell's claim to prejudice "the adjust-
ment of future grievances possessing dissimilar facts and 
circumstances.'' 
There is no ambiguity or equivocation in McDaniels' 
letter, and defendant's treatment of the -case as closed and 
finally terminated was fully warranted. And after receipt 
of this notice that the grievance was withdrawn and the 
case closed, the defendant, according to the testimony of Mr. 
Edens, its Superintendent, had always treated it as a closed 
issue (Tr. 42, 43). 
We pleaded the affirmative defense of estoppel against 
plaintiff to maintain this action five years after the above 
representations were made and to recover as damages "lost 
time" for five years, or, for that matter, to maintain any 
action at any time after defendant received the ·notice of 
withdrawal of the grievance. That the notice to defendant 
that it could treat the case as closed, and the defendant 
thereupon closing the case, operated to defendant's detri· 
ment if plaintiff )s now permitted to maintain this. action, 
we have not the slightest hesitancy in asserting. Up to the 
very moment the notice of withdrawal was received the 
matter was. an open issue with the defendant and considera· 
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tion was being given thereto, evidenced by exchanges of 
correspondence and personal conferences. Vice President 
Paulsen of the defendant company had not rejected plain-
tiff's claim and he had the undisputed authority to allow 
it in \Vhole or in part, or make any disposition thereof he 
deemed proper. Had the plaintiff himself not terminated 
all consideration of his case the mangement might have 
as frequently happens in these cases, ordered the reinstate-
ment of plaintiff "on a leniency basis" on "probation," 
plaintiff might have been returned to work without loss of 
seniority rights, or he might have been given a new sen-
iority date. He might have been given some back pay or he 
might have been returned to work without any allowance 
for time lost. True, his claim might have been rejected 
entirely, but it is not what might have been the ultimate dis-
position of the claim that determines whether or not defend-
ant incurs a detriment if plaintiff is allowed to maintain 
this suit. The detriment lies in the fact that the plaintiff 
caused the defendant by his representat~ons to cease weigh-
ing and considering the disposition of the claim, treating the 
matter as closed and not as an outstanding claim with, as it 
must always be considered, the possibility of ultimate liabil-
ity. Had the consideration by the defendant continued and 
resulted in total rejection of the claim, either party might 
have taken the matter for final determination to the Rail-
road Adjustment Board. The Railway Labor Act, Section 
3, First (i)., 45 U. S. C. A., Section 153, page 1022, provides 
that the carrier and employe failing to reach an adjustment 
by negotiation, 
"The dispute may be referred by petition of the 
parties or either party to the appropriate division of 
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the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the 
facts, and all data bearing upon the dispute." 
In Order of Railway Conductors v. Southern Railway 
Co,. 339 U. S. 255, 94 L. Ed. 542, 70 S. Ct. 585, cited supra, 
where negotiations between the railroad and union failed 
to bring about an agreement and the railroad had brought 
suit in the state court, the union filed a petition for a hear-
ing and award before the Adjustment Board. The Supreme 
Court of the United States reversed the holding of the state 
court for the reason that the court did not have jurisdic-
tion. We cite this case again at this point in support of the 
proposition that the defendant in this case had the opportun-
ity to progress its controversy with Russell to a final con-
clusion by submitting the matter to the Adjustment Board. 
The Supreme Court of the United States said: 
"Sustaining the court's action (in assuming 
jurisdiction) would invite races of diligence when-
ever a carrier or union preferred one forum to the 
other. And if a carrier or a union could choose a 
court instead of the Board the other party would be 
deprived of the privilege conferred by Section 3 
First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. A. 
Section 153 First ( i) , which provides that after 
negotiations have failed 'either party' may refer the 
dispute to the appropriate division of the Adjustment 
Board." 
We do not have to show that had the negotiations not 
been terminated by the plaintiff and resulted in refusal by 
the defendant to reinstate, that such action by the defendant 
would have been approved· by the Railroad Adjustment 
Board, in order to show that the defendant suffers a detri-
ment by such termination of negotiations by the plaintiff. 
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It would, of course, be impossible to show what disposition 
the Adjustment Board would make of the case in such an 
event, but the defendant had the right, that is, the oppor-
tunity to proceed to bring to a final conclusion the determin-
ation of a claimed liability with reasonable dispatch, and of 
that right it is deprived, to its detriment, if this suit after so 
long a lapse of time can now be maintained. The company 
justifiably considered the matter terminated in its favor. 
So long as there was any possibility that the company would 
ultimately have to return the plaintiff to work with pay 
for "lost time," the company would have or could have 
pushed the matter to a final conclusion to shorten the time 
they might have to pay wages to plaintiff without receiv-
ing services from him. Knowing that there was a possibil-
ity in a controversy of this kind that they would have to 
pay the employe wages for "lost time" if they ultimately 
failed to have the dismissal sustained, can anyone believe 
the defendant company would have let the matter rest for 
five years, risking the possibility of heavy damages if they 
finally lost the case? It was because of the plaintiff's ad-
vising defendant that he was withdrawing his grievance, 
that the case was "closed," that the defendant remained in-
active for so long, to its serious detriment, if this court 
says this case may now be maintained. But we reiterate that 
it is not what the ultimate outcome would have been had 
plaintiff not terminated the case that determines "detri-
ment," and it is not what course defendant would have pur-
sued, but for such termination, that determines "detri-
ment." Those matters are not known and cannot in the 
nature of things in such a case as this ever be made known, 
but the opportunity for the defendant to bring the case to 
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a successful conclusion or to reduce its damage, if not 
successful, by expediting its disposal was there, and it was 
there until destroyed by the plaintiff's advice to the defend-
ant to close the case. 
In Restatement of the Law, Contracts, Section 90, page 
110, the legal principle here involved is set forth as follows: 
"A promise which the promisor should reason-
ably expect to induce action or forebearance of a 
definite and substantial character on the part of the 
promisee and which does induce such action or fore-
bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only 
by enforcement of the promise." 
Injustice in this case, it seems to us, can be avoided only 
by requiring the plaintiff to retain the position he took when 
he advised the defendant that his grievance was withdrawn 
and that it could consider the controversy terminated. 
A statement of the rule is contained in the case of 
I. X. L. Stores Co. v. Suc·cess Markets, 98 Utah 124, 97 P. 
2d 577, in which this court said: 
"The estoppel here relied upon is known as an 
·equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais. The law upon 
the subject is well settled. The vital principle is that 
he who, by his language or conduct, leads another to 
do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not 
subject such person to loss or injury by disappoint· 
irng the expectat~ons upon which he acted. Such a 
change of position is sternly forbidden. This remedy 
has always applied so as to promote the ends of 
justice. It is available only for protection and can· 
not be used as a weapon of assault." 
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In "'" illiston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Volume I, 
page 494, Section 139, it is said: 
"It is generally true that one who has led 
another to act in reasonable reliance on his repre-
sentations of fact cannot afterwards in litigation 
between the two deny the truth of the representa-
ions * * * " 
Professor Williston, Volume I, Revised Edition, Section 
140, page 503, after quoting the rule from Restatement of 
Contracts, as above set forth, says : 
"It is not to be denied that there are numerous 
cases in which this element of justifiable reliance to 
one's detriment is held not sufficient to make a 
gratuitous promise binding. Therefore, Section 90 
(quoted above) does not assert a sweeping rule that 
in every case action in reliance is sufficient support 
for a promise." 
We are not certain that the factual situation in the 
case before the court involves a promise without assent or 
consideration. It seems to us that the forebearance on 
the part of the defendant to progress its dispute with the 
plaintiff Russell, in view of his representation that defend-
ant might treat the case as "closed," might well constitute 
consideration. If, however, that is not the case, the situa-
tion then falls within that well recognized principle of the 
law wherein estoppel is recognized as a substitute for con-
sideration. Probably there is no distinction, but merely a 
different rationale applied to the same problem. At any 
rate, it seems to us to clearly fall within the aforequoted pro-
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vision from the Restatement of Contracts and the discussion 
thereof by Professor Williston. Continuing, he says: 
"In the first place it is only where the action 
induced is definite and substantial that any legal 
consequences follow from the gratuitous promise. In 
the second place, such an action should reasonably 
have been expected by the promisor. Under these 
words it will not be enough that some action of the 
promisee even of substantial character has been in-
duced by the promise. A promise of one thousand 
dollars with which to buy a motor car may thus be 
binding if it induced the purchase of the car. A 
promise of one thousand dollars for no specified 
purpose will not be binding, though it induces similar 
action. If the promisee is helpless to do otherwise, 
he has not acted or foreborne in reliance on the 
promise within this doctrine. 
"Finally the words are added at the end of the 
section for greater caution 'if injustice can be avoid-
ed only by enforcement of the promise.' With these 
qualifications it is believed that the provisions of 
Section 90 (the Restatement) do not go beyond the 
existing law, in many jurisdictions at least, and that 
the section is a useful coordination of the classes of 
cases enumerated in the preceding section." 
That the action induced in the present case was "defi-
nite and substantial" should be apparent from the fact that 
it results in a very large judgment against defendant, if the 
plaintiff is now allowed to repudiate. Was defendant's 
action "reasonably" to be expected by the plaintiff Russell? 
What action on defendant's part other than treating the 
controversy "closed" and terminated could be expected 
when he advised the defendant in effect that the charge 
made against him was true, that he falsified, that he was 
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withdrawing his grievance, and that the defendant could 
consider the matter "closed"'? The promisee, the defend-
ant, was not helpless to do otherwise than it did. It might 
have, before negotiations were concluded, reinstated the 
plaintiff on some basis as frequently happens in such cases. 
It could have progressed this pending case, which had a 
potential liability, as all such controversies have, to final 
conclusion and with dispatch and avoided an accumulation 
of over $18,000.00 damages, except for the representations 
of the plaintiff himself. And finally, we believe the facts 
are such that "injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise." We would like to observe parentheti-
cally that the word "promise" is obviously used in the Re-
statement in a broad sense and it is readily apparent that 
it covers any kind of representation by words or conduct. 
We believe that this case now before the court fulfills 
the requirements of the law as set out in the Restatement 
and the carefully detailed analysis. thereof by Professor 
Williston. It is true that the earlier cases did not look with 
favor upon estoppel as a defense. The modern view is to 
consider the application of the doctrine of estoppel, particul-
arly the kind we are dealing with here, as comporting with 
the very highest sense of equity and pure justice. 
We submit that the plaintiff should be estopped to 
maintain this action, in view of his conduct and representa-
tions in leading the defendant to believe that the case was 
disposed of, and the defendant's reliance thereon to its 
detriment. We earnestly say to this court that on this as-
signment of error alone the case should be remanded to the 
District Court with instructions to enter judgment against 
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the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant of no cause of 
action. This disposition seems particularly appropriate in 
view of the plaintiff's admission that he falsified at the in-
vestigation-his admission that he was guilty of the charge 
upon which his dismissal was based and which is the whole 
basis for this suit. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY COMPE-
TENT EVIDENCE IN THE ,CASE, AND IN 
ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT UPON SUCH 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
In order to a void prolonging this brief we will endeavor 
to treat this assignment of error as briefly as possible. 
What we have heretofore said herein addresses itself per-
tinently to this assignment and should make it clear that the 
findings of fact (R. 51), and conclusions of law (R. 61), are 
unsupported by the evidence, and the judgment (R. 63) is 
based upon erroneous findings. 
The original judgment signed by the court gave to the 
plaintiff as damages the sum of $23,001.92, which was $4,-
000.00 more than the plaintiff was entitled to, figured in 
accordance with the court's theory, and was in excess of 
$8,000.00 over the amount demanded in the complaint (R. 
34) . We filed a motion to correct the judgment, to amend 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, asking the court 
pursuant to the new rules of procedure to enter judgment in 
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favor of the defendant of ''no cause of action'' (R. 48), 
and also filed a motion for a new trial ( R. 37). 
The plaintiff filed objections to our motion to amend 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law and to correct 
the judgment, submitted a new set of findings of fact and 
conclusions of la,,· and judgment to the court. The court 
disposed of the defendant's motion to correct the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, and motion for a 
new trial, by signing and having entered the amended find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment submitted by 
plaintiff's counsel (R. 54). Although it was not necessary 
under the new rules of practice and procedure for us to 
move the court to correct its findings and conclusions, in 
order to raise the matter on appeal, we considered _it was 
our duo/ to the trial court to fully present our views on the 
law and the evidence, which we did in oral argument almost 
in as much detail as set forth in this brief. When, how-
ever, the court signed another set of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment, which were substantially 
the same as the first set of findings, conclusions, and j udg-
ment signed, we considered we had discharged our respon-
sibility as counsel to the court and took this appeal. 
Without rearguing the matter, we submit that the evi-
dence was wholly insufficient to warrant the court in find-
ing, as it did, that during the entire ten day period, which 
was the period covered by the investigation, and up to and 
including the date of the hearing, the plaintiff was ill and 
under the care of Dr. Stratford (R. 58) ; that plaintiff's 
absence without leave in excess of ten days "was not inten-
tional or willful" (R. 58) ; that "the defendant wilfully and 
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arbitrarily discharged the plaintiff" (R. 59) ; that "on the .,I 
14th day of May, 1946, the said C. E. McDaniels withdrew 
as plaintiff's representative" (R. 59) ; and that "the plain-
tiff duly performed all things on his part required by the ·' 
contract as conditions to his reinstatement" (R. 61). 
As to the ·conclusions of law, we think there is no basis 
for concluding that Rule 55 (b) , which the plaintiff was 
charged with violating, "has no application to the facts 
surrounding plaintiff's absence"; that "plaintiff's rights -
to recover from the defendant by reason of defendant's -
wrongful discharge of plaintiff became fixed as of the 
22nd day of January, 1946"; that "plaintiff is not estopped 
from asserting his claim against the defendant" ; that "the 
defendant is not entitled to offset against time lost by plain-
tiff, by reason of its wrongful discharge of the plaintiff, 
other earnings of plaintiff during such period"; and that · 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover $18,892.76 from the de-
fendant (R. 61, 62). 
The judgment in this case is based upon findings and 
conclusions that are not supported ·by the evidence and 
we submit that the evidence is such that this court cannot 
remand the case with instructions to correct the findings 
and conclusions so as to support the judgment. We submit 
this assignment of error on the argument made in connec-
tion with the preceding points discussed. 
It seems to us that throughout the progress of this case 
the court construed the contract strictly against the defen-
dant in every particular where the plaintiff claimed a right, 
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~ and indulged the 'videst liberality in favor of the plaintiff 
· ·wherever the defendant sought to assert some right under 
: the contract. The plaintiff soug~ht to hold the defendant 
. to strict accountability and sought successfully the utmost 
. indulgence for himself. We think both parties are entitled 
. to the same treatment. This contract is not one drawn by 
: the defendant company so as to warrant such a method of 
_ interpretation and application. It is well known that this 
: type of contract is invariably the result of days and some-
:: times weeks of negotiations between the company and the 
union with a considerable number of men from each side 
::participating. Each side brings to the conference room long 
: experience in the labor relations problems of the industry. 
~- Both sides understand all phases of the subject matter, they 
: _ know what they want, they do not sign until they have each 
secured the best terms they think possible, and when they 
- do sign they know what their respective rights and duties 
are under the contract. They deal at arm's length and it 
~ cannot truthfully be said that either side has the other at 
-: a noticeable disadvantage in negotiating. Therein lies the 
_ success of the collective bargaining idea in American in-
-.- dustry. The contract in subsequent disputes should be con-
--
-_ strued and applied the same as to both parties and with 
.. _ fairness and impartiality. 
If we have not been helpful to the court by multiplying 
citations to adjudicated cases it is not because we have not 
made the effort. There have been relatively few cases of 
this type before the courts. and this explains the limited 
::: number of authorities which can be found close enough to 
~; the facts or the legal principles involved as to be worthy 
-~ of citation. Controversies such as. this one, as was most 
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plainly indicated by the Supreme 'Court of the United States, 
do not belong in the courts, nor have they, except in rela-
tively few instances, been submitted to the courts. An ex-
amination of the reports of the awards of the National Rail-
road Adjustment Board discloses that they are disposing 
of approximately 1500 cases a year arising under collective 
bargaining agreements. entered. into pursuant to the Rail-
way Labor Act. 
We respectfully submit that this case should be re-
manded to the District Court with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plain-
tiff of "no cause of action", such dis·position being amply 
warranted under either Point V or Point VI. We further 
submit that the trial court committed reversible error in 
admitting the transcript of the proceedings at the official 
investigation as substantive evidence, in denying the de-
fendant's motion for a judgment of nonsuit, in refusing to 
admit evidence offered by the defendant to show justifica-
tion for plaintiff's dismissal, in assessing damages in the 
manner it did, and that these errors individually, and cer-
tainly collectively, warrant the court in at least reversing 
the judgment and remanding the case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Counsel for 
Defendant and Appellant 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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